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Abstract
This paper provides a complete study for the possible rankings of success and de-
cisiveness for individuals in symmetric voting systems, assuming anonymous and inde-
pendent probability distributions. It is proved that for any pair of symmetric voting
systems it is always possible to rank success and decisiveness in opposite order whenever
the common probability of voting for \acceptance" is big enough. On the contrary, for
probability values lower than one{half it is not possible to reverse the ranking of these
two measures.
Keywords: Success; Decisiveness; Symmetric simple voting games; Common and oppo-
site rankings
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider an scenario in which the members of a set of voters have to decide
on an unchangeable external proposal by means of a voting rule, each voter can only vote
in favor or against it, and the outcome decision is either to accept or to reject the proposal.
We assume that each member decides his vote independently of the others and even from his
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own vote in previous or future occasions.
Many democratic institutions make decisions according to the results obtained in a sym-
metrical voting system following the principle "one man one vote". In this voting context two
indices excel: one of them measures the decisiveness of each voter and the other measures
his success. Both indices are important in decision{making and in human resources, and the
comparisons between these two indices, either in the same voting game or in two dierent
games, are necessary to better understand the importance of voters from these two points of
view.
As usual, a voting system is modeled as a simple game (N;W), where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng
denotes the set of voters, the cardinal jN j = n > 1, each subset of N is a coalition, and W
is a monotonic collection of coalitions, called winning coalitions. Subsets of N that are not
in W are called losing coalitions. We assume that ; =2 W and N 2 W .
The simple games we will deal with in this paper are the symmetric gamesWk on N , also
called k-out-of-n games, dened for any k (1  k  n) by
S 2 Wk , jSj  k
In the symmetric game Wk, the number k is the level of consensus of the game, since k
is the minimum number of voters required to approve a proposal.
Recall that a simple game is strong if two disjoint coalitions cannot be both losing, it is
proper if two disjoint coalitions cannot be both winning, and it is decisive (or a constant{sum
game) if it is both, strong and proper. If a game is decisive then, for any S  N , exactly one
of the two coalitions S and NnS is winning, so that jWj = 2n 1. It is known (see May [16])
that a k-out-of-n game (N;Wk) is decisive if and only if n is odd and k = n+12 . In this article
n can be odd or even, but we assume that k > n
2
, which implies that the game (N;Wk) is
proper.
Before the votes are cast it is not possible to know which coalition (formed by the \yes"
voters) will emerge, but we assume that an estimation p(S) is made of the probability of
occurrence of each vote conguration S that may arise.
In this paper we assume that, for any S  N , the probability p(S) is given by
p(S) = ps(1  p)n s
where p is a xed value in [0; 1] and s stands for jSj. This is equivalent to assuming that
each voter, independently of the others, votes \yes" with probability p and votes \no" with
probability 1   p. Laruelle and Valenciano ([15]) refer to this distribution of probability as
being anonymous and independent.
The idea of decisiveness has been widely used as a basis for the most well{known power
indices such as the Shapley-Shubik index ([22], [23], [7]) or the four proportional indices:
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Penrose ([20]), Banzhaf ([1]), Coleman to prevent action and Coleman to initiate action ([6]),
and many authors have referred to this aspect when analyzing power indices (see, for exam-
ple, [11], [17], [24] or [25]). But only a few authors before A. Laruelle and F. Valenciano had
referred to the idea of success (the likelihood of obtaining the result that one votes for) as
being also a relevant point to take into account when measuring voting power (see [2], [3],
[4], [12], [21], [19]). The sound and lucid analysis made by Laruelle and Valenciano about
these concepts in [14], [13] and [15] lead us to work on the cases described in this paper.
Being more specic, they proved in [13] that success and decisiveness are in general not only
conceptually dierent but also analytically independent, and they showed in [15] (Example
3.1) that two symmetric games can be dierently ranked from these two points of view.
The goal of our work is to compare the success and the decisiveness of a voter in sym-
metric games, with anonymous and independent probability distribution, for dierent levels
of consensus. We also compare, by using a convenient scale, the values of the two indices
for a voter in a xed game of the same kind. In section 2 the denitions of the success (ex
ante) index 
i, and the decisiveness (ex ante) index i of a voter i are recalled, and their
expressions for the cases under study are shown. In section 3 we compare the decisiveness
index of a voter for dierent levels of consensus k, and an analogous study is done in section
4 for the success index. Section 5 is devoted to compare 
 and 1
2
+ 1
2
, for a xed k and for
all possible values of p 2 [0; 1], since it is known that these two values coincide when p = 1
2
.
Finally, section 6 summarizes the work and points out the main conclusions.
2 Success and decisiveness ex ante
In this section we recall the denitions of success and decisiveness ex ante given in [13] or
[14] and evaluate them in our particular cases.
2.1 Estimating a voter's ex ante success
After a decision is made, a voter is considered to have been successful if his vote happens to
be in accordance with the result, that is to say, if either he voted in favor of the proposal
and it has been accepted or he voted against the proposal and it has been rejected. Before
the votes are cast, the voter i's (ex ante) success is the probability that i is successful:
Denition 2.1

i(W ; p) =
X
S  N
i 2 S 2 W
p(S) +
X
S  N
i =2 S =2 W
p(S):
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Assuming that (N;Wk) is a k-out-of-n game, p is a xed value in [0; 1], and p(S) =
ps(1   p)n s for any S  N , then we write 
(Wk; p) instead of 
i(Wk; p) since its value is
the same for any voter i and p depends only of p. In this case it is:

(Wk; p) =
nX
s=k

n  1
s  1

ps(1  p)n s

+
k 1X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s

: (1)
If p = 1
2
this index 
 is precisely the Rae index, introduced in [21] for symmetric games and
extended to any simple game in [8]. Notice also that 
(Wk; 0) = 
(Wk; 1) = 1.
Let us see that the expression of 
(Wk; p) can be written in another way that will be
used further on in this paper.
Using that
1 = (p+ 1  p)n 1 =
n 1X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

=
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

+
n 1X
s=k 1

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

we can write:

(Wk; p) =
n 1X
s=k 1

n  1
s

ps+1(1  p)n s 1

+
k 1X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s

= p 
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps+1(1  p)n s 1

+
k 1X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s

= p+

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1 p)n k+1+(1 2p)
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

: (2)
2.2 Estimating a voter's ex ante decisiveness
After a decision is made, a voter is considered to have been decisive if he was successful
and his vote was critical to that success. Before the votes are cast, the voter i's (ex ante)
decisiveness is the probability that i is decisive:
Denition 2.2
i(W ; p) =
X
S  N
i 2 S 2 W
S n fig =2 W
p(S) +
X
S  N
i =2 S =2 W
S [ fig 2 W
p(S):
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Assuming that (N;Wk) is a k-out-of-n game, p is a xed value in [0; 1], and p(S) =
ps(1   p)n s for any S  N , then we write (Wk; p) instead of i(Wk; p), analogously as
what we did for 
 in the former subsection. Now we have:
(Wk; p) =

n  1
k   1

pk(1  p)n k +

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k+1
(Wk; p) =

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k: (3)
If p = 1
2
this index  is precisely the Banzhaf index ([1], [8], [18]). Notice also that
(Wk; 0) = 0, (Wk; 1) = 0 if k < n and (W ; 1) = 1 if k = n.
3 Decisiveness of a voter in dierent games
The purpose of this section is to analyze the changes in the ex ante decisiveness of a voter when
the level of consensus changes, that is to say, our goal here is to compare the decisiveness
of a voter for dierent values of k, in k-out-of-n games with anonymous and independent
probability distribution.
We consider two dierent proper symmetric games on the same set of voters: (N;Wk) and
(N;Wr) with n2 < k < r  n. Let us denote by k(p) and r(p) the decisiveness indices
corresponding to an arbitrary voter in (N;Wk) and (N;Wr), respectively. We are going to
study the dierence k(p)  r(p).
k(p)  r(p) =

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k  

n  1
r   1

pr 1(1  p)n r
= pk 1(1  p)n r

n  1
k   1

(1  p)r k  

n  1
r   1

pr k

:
For any k (n
2
< k < r < n) the equation k(p)  r(p) = 0 has three dierent roots: p = 0,
p = 1 and p = pk;r dened by:
pk;r =
"
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k
+ 1
# 1
: (4)
For r = n the equation k(p)  r(p) = 0 has only the roots p = 0 and p = pk;r, because in
this case k(1)  2n 1(1) =  1.
In the following theorem some properties of the roots pk;r are established.
Theorem 3.1
Let k; r be such that n
2
< k < r  n, and pk;r be the number dened in (4).
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a) pk;r 2 (12 ; 1).
b) pk;k+1 =
k
n
.
c) If r < n then pk;r < pk;r+1.
d) If k > n
2
+ 1 then pk 1;r < pk;r.
e) pk;r  n 1n .
Proof:
To see that pk;r 2 (12 ; 1) rst notice that
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)! =
r kY
j=1
n  k   j + 1
r   j : (5)
It is clear that (5) is strictly positive, and, since k + r > n, it is n k j+1
r j < 1 for any
j (1  j  r   k), so that (5) is strictly lower than 1. Then, from (4) we deduce that
1
2
< pk;r < 1.
Part b) is obtained directly from the expression (4) with r = k + 1.
To prove part c) we need to assume that r < n and see that
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k
>

(k   1)!(n  k)!
r!(n  r   1)!
 1
r+1 k
:
This inequality is equivalent to
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k+1
>
(k   1)!(n  k)!
r!(n  r   1)! ;
and also equivalent to 
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k
>
n  r
r
:
But this last inequality is true because n k j+1
r j >
n r
r
for any j (1  j  r   k), and using
(5) we have
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)! >

n  r
r
r k
:
In a similar way, to prove part d) we assume that k > n
2
+ 1 and see that
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k
<

(k   2)!(n  k + 1)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r+1 k
:
This inequality is equivalent to
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k+1
<
(k   2)!(n  k + 1)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
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and also equivalent to 
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
 1
r k
<
n  k + 1
k   1 :
But this is true because n k j+1
r j <
n k+1
k 1 for any j (1  j  r   k), and using (5) it is
(k   1)!(n  k)!
(r   1)!(n  r)! <

n  k + 1
k   1
r k
:
As a consequence of parts c) and d) it is always pk;r  pn 1;n . From part b) it is pn 1;n = n 1n
so that
pk;r  n  1
n
:

As a consequence of Theorem 3.1 we observe that for any k; r with n
2
< k < r  n, the
dierence k(p)   r(p) has dierent sign depending on p being lower than pk;r or greater
than it. Theorem 3.1{a) and Theorem 3.1{e) give bounds for the change of sign of the
dierence k(p) r(p), so that this change always occurs in the interval (1
2
; n 1
n
]. Theorem
3.1{c) and Theorem 3.1{d) tell us that if the consensus level is increased in only one of the
two games then the sign change occurs at a higher value. Theorem 3.1{b) gives the value of
sign change for two consecutive levels of consensus. And, nally, if we combine parts b), c)
and d) of Theorem 3.1 we can observe that:
 The minimum value for pk;r is
bn
2
c+ 1
n
, and it is attained when k gives the absolute
majority rule and r = k + 1.
 The maximum value for pk;r is n  1
n
, and it is attained for r = n (unanimity rule) and
k = r   1.
The sign of the dierence k(p)  r(p) is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2
Let k; r be such that n
2
< k < r  n, and pk;r be the number dened in (4). Then,
k(p) > r(p) for any p 2 (0; pk;r) and k(p) < r(p) for any p 2 (pk;r; 1):
Proof:
To prove this we are going to verify that k
 
1
2
  r  1
2

> 0.
k

1
2

  r

1
2

=

1
2
n 1 
n  1
k   1

 

n  1
r   1

=

1
2
n 1
(n  1)!
(r   1)!(n  r)!
"
r kY
j=1
(r   j) 
r kY
j=1
(n  k   j + 1)
#
;
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and this expression is strictly positive because k + r > n + 1 and so n   k   j + 1 < r   j
for any j. Thus, k(p)   r(p) > 0 for any p 2 (0; pk;r) and k(p)   r(p) < 0 for any
p 2 (pk;r; 1):
By combining Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 we can establish that, in any case, there
are values of p for which k(p) > r(p), and other values of p for which k(p) < r(p). 
Corollary 3.3
Let k; r be such that n
2
< k < r  n. Then, k(p) > r(p) for any p 2 (0; 1
2
) and
k(p) < r(p) for any p 2 (n 1
n
; 1):
Figure 1 shows the graph of k(p) r(p) for n = 7 and all possible k; r with n
2
< k < r  n.
–1
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Figure 1: k(p)  r(p) for n = 7 and all possible k; r with n
2
< k < r  n:
Independently of the levels of consensus k and r of the symmetric games Wk and Wr, we
have seen that for p < 1
2
a lower level of consensus in the game implies a greater decisiveness
for voters, whereas if p is close to 1 (more precisely, if p takes any value greater than 1  1
n
)
then this relationship is reversed. Between p = 1
2
and p = 1  1
n
this relationship depends on
the levels of consensus k and r, and it is detailed in Proposition 3.2. The only choices of k
and r that lead to the upper bound 1  1
n
for pk;r are k = n  1 and r = n (unanimity rule),
but even in this situation the change of sign of the dierence k(p)   r(p) is guaranteed.
This fact becomes crucial, since, as we are going to see in the next section, the success index
behaves more regularly than decisiveness index.
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4 Success of a voter in dierent games
As was done for the decisiveness in Section 3, the purpose of this section is to analyze the
changes in the ex ante success of a voter when the level of consensus changes, that is to say,
our goal here is to compare the success of a voter for dierent values of k, in k-out-of-n games
with anonymous and independent probability distribution.
We consider two dierent proper symmetric games on the same set of voters: (N;Wk) and
(N;Wr) with n2 < k < r  n. Let us denote by 
k(p) and 
r(p) the success indices
corresponding to an arbitrary voter in the rst and the second mentioned games, respectively.
We are going to study the dierence 
k(p)  
r(p).
Theorem 4.1

k(p)  
r(p)  0 for any p 2 [0; 1], and the inequality is strict if p 2 (0; 1).
Proof:
Using (1) we can write:

k(p)  
r(p) =
r 1X
s=k

n  1
s  1

ps(1  p)n s  
r 1X
s=k

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s
=
r 1X
s=k
ps(1  p)n s

n  1
s  1

 

n  1
s

=
r 1X
s=k
ps(1  p)n s (n  1)!
s!(n  s)!(2s  n)  0
because 2s  n > 0 for any s  k. 
Figure 2 shows the graph of 
k(p) 
r(p) for n = 7 and all possible k; r with n
2
< k < r  n.
Theorem 4.1 tells us that, no matter which are the levels of consensus to be compared,
the lower the level of consensus demanded the higher the index of success of the voters.
Putting together the results obtained in the previous and in the present section we may
compare Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 4.1 to deduce that the indices of decisiveness and
success rank voters in a dierent way depending on the values of p.
Corollary 4.2
Let k; r be such that n
2
< k < r  n, and pk;r be the number dened in (4). Then,
a) If p 2 (0; pk;r) then 
k(p) > 
r(p) and k(p) > r(p):
b) If p 2 (pk;r; 1) then 
k(p) > 
r(p) and k(p) < r(p):
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Figure 2: 
k(p)  
r(p) for n = 7 and all possible k; r with n
2
< k < r  n:
Finally, by using Corollary 3.3 and Theorem 4.1, we can establish that, independently of
the particular values of k and r, for values of p smaller than 1
2
success and decisiveness indices
rank voters in the same way, and for values of p near one (more precisely, if n 1
n
< p < 1)
then these two indices rank voters in an opposite way.
Notice that, while decisiveness has a quite irregular behavior for voters, success behaves
always in the same way: the higher the level of consensus required the lower the success of
voters. Consequently, the dierent rankings between success and decisiveness depend on the
behavior of decisiveness. In fact, if the value of p is large enough then the opposite ranking
between success and decisiveness is guaranteed, independently of the values of k, r and n.
5 Comparing success and decisiveness in the same game
It is obvious that i(W ; p)  
i(W ; p) for any game (N;W), any i 2 N , and any vote
conguration p. In the particular case of p(S) = 1
2n
for any S  N it happens that 
i(W ; p) =
1
2
+ 1
2
i(W ; p), as was anticipated by Penrose in [20] and proved by Dubey and Shapley in [8].
However, in general, 
i(W ; p) 6= 12 + 12i(W ; p), and the equality holds for all W if and only
if all vote congurations are equally probable (see [13]). We are going to compare these two
magnitudes for dierent anonymous and independent probability distributions. The study
in this section is nothing else than a comparison between success and decisiveness by using
a convenient scale, and it complements the ordinal comparisons we have established in the
two precedent sections.
Our goal in this section is to compare 
(Wk; p) and 12 + 12(Wk; p), for a xed k (with
n
2
< k  n to ensure that the game is proper) and to see whether there are other values of p,
apart from p = 1
2
, for which they are coincident.
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Theorem 5.1 Let Dk(p) = 
(Wk; p)  12   12(Wk; p). Then:
a) There are two roots of Dk(p) = 0 in [0; 1]. One of them is
1
2
, and the other, pk, is in
[1
2
; 1].
b) pk =
1
2
if and only if n is odd and k = n+1
2
.
In this case 1
2
is a double root of Dk(p) = 0.
c) pk < pk+1 for any k with
n
2
< k  n.
d) pn = 1.
Proof:
Using (2) and (3) we can write:
Dk(p) = 
(Wk; p)  12   12(Wk; p)
= p  1
2
+

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k(1
2
  p) + (1  2p)
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

= (
1
2
  p)
"
 1 +

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k + 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1
#
:
Thus, it is clear that p = 1
2
is a root of Dk(p) = 0 independently of the values of k and n.
Let us prove that there is another root of Dk(p) = 0 in [
1
2
; 1]. To this end, we will prove that
the equation Mk(p) = 0 has a unique root pk in [
1
2
; 1], where Mk(p) is given by
Mk(p) =  1 +

n  1
k   1

pk 1(1  p)n k + 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1

: (6)
Existence:
It is easy to check that for k = n it is Mn(1) = 0, which proves that a root of Mn(p) = 0 is
pn = 1.
For the remaining values of k (n
2
< k < n) it is Mk(1) =  1, and we will see that Mk(12)  0.
From Bolzano's theorem, this will prove that there is at least one root of Mk(p) = 0 in [
1
2
; 1].
Mk

1
2

=  1 +

1
2
n 1 "
n  1
k   1

+ 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s
#
:
But, taking into account that
2n 1 =
n 1X
s=0

n  1
s



n  1
k   1

+ 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

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it is 
1
2
n 1 "
n  1
k   1

+ 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s
#
 1
and this proves that Mk(
1
2
)  0. Notice that the equality holds if and only if n is odd and
k = n+1
2
, i.e., when the game is decisive. In this case, a root of Mn+1
2
(p) = 0 is pn+1
2
= 1
2
.
Thus, if n+1
2
< k < n then Mk(
1
2
) > 0 and Mk(1) < 0, so that there exist at least a value
pk 2 (12 ; 1) such that Mk(pk) = 0.
Uniqueness:
We will see now that dMk
dp
< 0 for any p 2 (0; 1). This will prove that pk is the only root of
Mk(p) = 0 in (0; 1). By dierentiating (6) with respect to p we get:
dMk
dp
=

n  1
k   1

(k   1)pk 2(1  p)n k  

n  1
k   1

(n  k)pk 1(1  p)n k 1
+2
k 2X
s=1

n  1
s

s ps 1(1  p)n s 1

 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

(n  s  1)ps(1  p)n s 2

:
Now, if we take s = t + 1 in the rst summation operator with index s, take s = t in the
second one, and add up these terms separately we get, for 0  t  k   3:
2

n  1
t+ 1

(t+ 1)pt(1  p)n t 2   2

n  1
t

(n  t  1)pt(1  p)n t 2
= 2pt(1  p)n t 2(n  1)!

t+ 1
(t+ 1)!(n  t  2)!  
n  t  1
t!(n  t  1)!

= 0:
Thus,
dMk
dp
=

n  1
k   1

(k   1)pk 2(1  p)n k  

n  1
k   1

(n  k)pk 1(1  p)n k 1 
 2

n  1
k   2

(n  k + 1)pk 2(1  p)n k
=  

n  1
k   1

pk 2(1  p)n k 1 [(1  p)(k   1) + p(n  k)] :
This proves that dMk
dp
< 0 for any p 2 (0; 1), because k  1, n  k, with at least one of these
inequalities being strict (we are assuming that n > 1), ensures that (1 p)(k 1)+p(n k) > 0.
Thus, the existence of a unique value pk 2 [12 ; 1] such that Mk(pk) = 0 is ensured. It is clear
now that pn = 1 (part d) of the theorem), and that pk =
1
2
if and only if n is odd and
k = n+1
2
(part b) of the theorem). In all other cases pk 2 (12 ; 1).
Finally, to prove part c) we will see that Mk+1(pk) > 0. From (6) it is:
Mk+1(pk) =  1 +

n  1
k

pkk(1  pk)n k 1 + 2
k 1X
s=0

n  1
s

psk(1  pk)n s 1

:
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But
Mk(pk) =  1 +

n  1
k   1

pk 1k (1  pk)n k + 2
k 2X
s=0

n  1
s

psk(1  pk)n s 1

= 0;
so that we can write
Mk+1(pk) =

n  1
k

pkk(1  pk)n k 1 +

n  1
k   1

pk 1k (1  pk)n k > 0:

In Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 we can visualize dierent results of Theorem 5.1.
Figure 3: Dk(p) for n = 9 and k = 5: Figure 4: Dk(p) for n = 9 and k = 7: Figure 5: Dk(p) for n = 9 and k = 9:
Figure 6: Dk(p) for n = 10 and k = 6; 7; 8; 9; 10:
Theorem 5.1 proves that, for any k, there are two values of p for which the linear rela-
tionship Dk(p) = 
(Wk; p)   12   12(Wk; p) = 0 holds, and shows the values of p for which
this dierence Dk(p) is positive (or negative). This last point is made explicit in the next
corollary.
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Corollary 5.2
For every k (n
2
< k  n) there exists pk 2 [12 ; 1] such that
a) 
(Wk; p)  12 + 12(Wk; p) for any p 2 [0; 12 ] [ [pk; 1].
b) 
(Wk; p)  12 + 12(Wk; p) for any p 2 [12 ; pk].
As a consequence, it is clear that, except when n is odd and k = n+1
2
, i.e., when the game
is decisive, it is always possible to nd two values of p for which the comparison between

(Wk; p) and 12 + 12(Wk; p) give opposite results. In other words, Corollary 5.2 proves that
Dk(p) takes positive and negative values for all symmetric games not being decisive, and
that decisive symmetric games are the only symmetric games for which Dk(p) is always non{
negative, and strictly positive for all p 6= 1
2
. The last corollary in this section points out this
fact, i.e., that the only symmetric games in which success exceeds one{half plus one{half
times the decisiveness are the decisive symmetric games.
Corollary 5.3

(Wk; p)  12 + 12(Wk; p) for any p 2 [0; 1] if and only if (N;Wk) is decisive.
6 Conclusions
It is known (see [20], [8]) that the success index 
i(W ; p) and the decisiveness index i(W ; p)
of a voter i show the linear relationship 
i(W ; p) = 12 + 12i(W ; p), for any voting system
(N;W), when the probability p(S) of any vote conguration S is uniformly given by p(S) =
1
2n
. This relation has somehow contributed to the historical viewing of success as a byproduct
of decisiveness. Laruelle and Valenciano proved in [13] that this relationship is not true in
general, even for k-out-of-n games, which include the majority and the unanimity voting
systems. Specically, they proved that 
i(W ; p) = 12 + 12i(W ; p) for any simple game
(N;W) if and only if p = 1
2
.
In this paper we consider proper k-out-of-n games (N;Wk) and assume that each voter,
independently of the others, votes \yes" with probability p and votes\no" with probability
1  p. In this case the success and the decisiveness indices are the same for any voter i and
are respectively denoted by 
(Wk; p) and (Wk; p).
In Sections 3 and 4 we consider dierent proper symmetric games (N;Wk) and (N;Wr),
with k < r, on the same set of voters N . Excluding the extreme cases p = 0 and p = 1
we prove that the decisiveness in both games coincide for exactly one value of p, p = pk;r 2
(1
2
; n 1
n
), and that (Wk; p) > (Wr; p) if and only if p 2 (0; pk;r). Finally it is proved that

(Wk; p) > 
(Wr; p) for any p 2 (0; 1), and this shows that there always exist values of p
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for which 
(Wk; p) > 
(Wr; p) and (Wk; p) < (Wr; p). In particular this happens for any
p 2 (n 1
n
; 1), independently of the values of k and r.
In Section 5 we compare success and decisiveness of a voter in a same game by using
1
2
+ 1
2
(Wk; p) instead of (Wk; p). This seems to be an adequate scale to compare these
two values since it is known that 
(Wk; p) = 12 + 12(Wk; p) when p = 12 . We prove that
this relationship holds for two values of p, one of them is p = 1
2
, as it was known, and the
other one is a value pk 2 [12 ; 1]. This value pk reaches its minimum 12 if and only if the game
(N;Wk) is decisive, i.e., n is odd and k = n+12 . We prove that pk increases as k increases and
it reaches its maximum value 1 for k = n, i.e., for unanimity games. As a consequence we see
that 
(Wk; p)  12 + 12(Wk; p) for any p 2 [12 ; pk] and the inequality holds in the opposite
sense for the rest of p 2 [0; 1].
In this paper we have described a simple mathematical procedure to compare the deci-
siveness and the success of a voter in two dierent arbitrary symmetric voting games, and to
detect when the two notions are in conict, i.e., they rank voters in an opposite way. Our
results can be used to evaluate the respective degrees of success and decisiveness of voters in
democratic voting systems, and this would help decision{makers to design appropriate vot-
ing systems being able to maximize a good combination between success and decisiveness. It
would be also interesting to extend the comparison between success and decisiveness made in
this article to any simple game (N;W). In particular, in a future work we will try to identify
the games for which these two indices are ordinally equivalent, following the research in [5],
[9] and [10].
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